

my decisions about what to do. When I think about letting myself kill, I am assuming that the killing behavior is not (or no longer) appropriately connected to my current deliberation: it is something that I mitigate the effects of rather than something that reflects my current decisions about what to do. Later, Persson himself discusses the contrast between regarding actions as *decidable* by one and as reliably *predictable* by one irrespective of one's current decision (186). When deliberating, conduct that is viewed as decidable in that deliberation has a special status. Nonetheless, my past agency and the non-intentional actions of my body matter. On my view, the AOD is made up of both constraints against harming and permissions to allow harm: permissions to allow harm prevent agents from being forced to use their bodies and other resources to protect others. A requirement to use your body to protect someone from a threat in which your body plays a significant role does not seem to put your body at the other's use in the same way as a requirement to protect them from independent threats.

Persson raises a series of fascinating challenges to the defenders of the DNR and the AOD. My responses have been of necessity very sketchy. I hope I have said enough to suggest that Persson's objections do not decisively show that we must abandon these aspects of commonsense morality. Instead they might stimulate the defender of the AOD to clarify and improve her position. Although I do not think that Persson has shown decisively that we must reject the DNR and AOD, these aspects of commonsense morality are certainly controversial: both Persson's own arguments and arguments elsewhere in the literature give ample reason for skepticism. Given this, it is well worth exploring the implications of revising commonsense morality. In providing a vision of such a revised morality, and how it would fit with other important aspects of practical reason, *From Morality to the End of Reason* makes a valuable contribution.

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Scherkoske, Greg. *Integrity and the Virtues of Reason: Leading a Convincing Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 264. \$99.00 (cloth).

Greg Scherkoske's *Integrity and the Virtues of Reason: Leading a Convincing Life* defends the view that integrity is an epistemic virtue. He uses a distinctive method for defending the main thesis. In the first chapter he proposes eight "data points" (or "platitudes") that, he claims, any theory of integrity must accommodate (5–9). He maintains that the platitudes provide standards of descriptive and normative adequacy for theories of integrity—more on this below. He deploys these standards of descriptive and normative adequacy throughout the book to evaluate the plausibility of various theories of integrity. Unsurprisingly, he argues that his theory of integrity as an epistemic virtue is the most descriptively and normatively adequate theory on the market. He argues that integrity is not a moral virtue (because he assumes that if integrity is a moral virtue, then it is not an epistemic virtue). To make the case for this unusual claim, he examines Bernard Williams's conception of integrity and the literature on the relation of integrity and impartial morality. In this review I examine (1) his method of argumentation, (2) his

conception of integrity as an epistemic virtue and his rejection of the view that integrity is a moral virtue, and (3) his discussion of Williams's conception of integrity. A recurring theme in my evaluation of Scherkoske's arguments is that they stick too closely to conventional wisdom about integrity and do not adequately explain some of the central claims.

THE METHOD

Scherkoske regards the platitudes of integrity as a set of intuitions that must be granted by any plausible conception of integrity. He formulates a list of eight platitudes that "talk of integrity picks out; not all are uncontroversial or uncontested" (6):

1. *Stickiness*: "a person's resistance to sacrificing or compromising his convictions";
2. *Integrity within reason*: "the tendency of a person to stand by her convictions must be responsive to reasons";
3. Integrity's *range*: persons of integrity may have convictions whose content ranges across a wide variety of values (e.g., moral, aesthetic, and "intellectual" convictions);
4. *Truthfulness*: "integrity appears to have a noncontingent connection to traits of truthfulness such as honesty, sincerity and fair-dealing" and vices opposed to truthfulness (e.g., dishonesty) directly undermine integrity;
5. *Coherence*: persons of integrity "know who they are" and that suggests a coherence between their conduct and convictions;
6. *Resoluteness*: "integrity is manifest in behavior; persons of integrity have a characteristic kind of resolve."
7. *Moral sanity*: "having integrity is incompatible with gross moral turpitude."
8. *Judgment*: "in matters of importance when we seek advice, guidance or mentoring, we are especially keen that the people whose cooperation, advice and guidance we seek are persons of integrity." (6–8)

Scherkoske contends that these platitudes provide the standards of descriptive and normative adequacy for any theory of integrity. He writes that a theory is descriptively adequate "just in case, and to the extent that, it fits with our more or less agreed upon experience, linguistic practice and judgments," and it is normatively adequate "to the extent that it coheres with our intuitions about its value and who does (or does not) have it" (17).

Scherkoske's device of formulating platitudes of integrity bears some resemblance to "the Canberra plan," but he does not explain whether the platitudes provide an a priori analysis or provide Ramsey sentences for the concept of integrity. It would have been helpful for Scherkoske to compare and contrast his method of deploying the platitudes to their use in the work of Lewis and Jackson.

One problem with this method of argumentation is that it is theft over honest toil to assume that these platitudes are desiderata for the descriptive and normative adequacy of a theory of integrity. One's stance on the issues of whether persons of integrity can have evil projects and whether there are any normative

constraints on the content of the projects of persons of integrity is a fundamental issue in the literature. One's views on these issues should be backed with arguments and not by appeals to "our linguistic practices." The "moral sanity," "integrity within reason," and "judgment" conditions presuppose Scherkoske's own theory of integrity rather than provide us with linguistic data that must be accommodated. The "judgment" condition is particularly idiosyncratic. Scherkoske uses a cheap strategy that is widespread among philosophers: define one's own solution to a problem into the desiderata of a theory (or the individuating conditions for a concept) that addresses the problem and then show that rival theories fail because they do not meet those desiderata. Not only are many of the platitudes "contested," it is implausible that they are conceptual requirements (or individuating conditions) for integrity. In fact, there does not seem to be a unified and widespread linguistic practice associated with everyday uses of 'integrity' by English speakers. When a lifelong resident of rural North Carolina says, "Jesse Helms had a lot of integrity" that person is saying something that is not true (and is probably expressing racist allegiances). Helms lacked moral and personal integrity, but that fact is not based in the linguistic practices associated with the term 'integrity'. People fail to have personal integrity by not satisfying their own personal standards, and one fails to have moral integrity by not satisfying objective moral standards. Garden-variety uses of the term 'integrity' do not require reasons responsiveness, moral sanity, or "judgment." Many everyday uses of 'integrity' are synonymous with 'honesty'. It is grossly implausible that (even if one restricts the scope of uses of 'integrity' to contexts in which people, and not bridges or sports, are the subject of attributions of 'integrity') there is a unique dispositional property associated with everyday uses of the term. Moreover, it is doubtful that people value the various admirable traits that are expressed with the term 'integrity' in the same way and to the same extent. Just compare uses of 'integrity' in different regions of the United States. Carefully attending to the ways in which people use 'integrity' suggests a vastly more heterogeneous set of descriptive properties and modes of expression than is captured by the method of inventing a list of theoretically loaded platitudes. The overly descriptive picture of language that is assumed by the use of platitudes is at odds with the fully expressive range and common use of metaphor in our linguistic practices. When sorting out what people are saying when they attribute 'integrity' as a positive evaluation of people and deeds, it is important to clearly distinguish honesty, moral integrity, and personal integrity.

INTEGRITY AS AN EPISTEMIC VIRTUE

Even if there is a distinctive virtue that requires all of the platitudes, the trait that is described does not need to be construed as a conception of integrity in order for it to be of theoretical interest to those working in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. About half of the book (chaps. 3–5) is devoted to the task of articulating Scherkoske's conception of this epistemic virtue and defending the claim that it is not a moral virtue. He takes it as a working assumption that "a virtue cannot be *both* an epistemic virtue and a moral virtue" (70). The obscure contrast between epistemic and moral virtues that is assumed is never made clear. There are obvious problems that are not addressed. By intentionally remaining agnostic about central debates in metaethics (e.g., "the Frege-Geach problem") and primarily relying

on his standards of descriptive and normative adequacy, the arguments developed in the book provide no stance on the nature of moral judgment and thereby have nothing to say about the nature of moral disagreement or moral reasons. (There is a brief section on “the epistemic significance of disagreement,” but the primary aim of that discussion is to unveil his concept of “self-trust”—more on that below [119–28].) Without an account of what is distinctive about moral virtues and moral responsibility, the contrast he makes with epistemic virtues and epistemic responsibility is confusing. It would have been more interesting and fruitful if the discussion would have focused on the relation of his conception of integrity and *phronēsis*. (There is a perfunctory discussion of *phronēsis* and the virtues, but the arguments would have greatly benefited from more details on his conception of the virtues [78–79].)

Scherkoske maintains that the epistemic virtue of integrity that he describes can “underwrite the attractive idea that integrity requires an *intelligent* adherence to one’s convictions through the reasoned and epistemically responsible manner in which one holds, revises and expresses those convictions” (88). According to Scherkoske, integrity is “an excellence of epistemic agency in the broadest sense: it is an excellence of persons concerned to hold and act upon their epistemically responsible convictions” (91). He also asserts that, “generally speaking, people are similarly constituted as epistemic agents” (124). He claims that people are roughly on par with regard to their epistemic status (“we must accept that in general others are about as cognitively well placed as ourselves” [124]), and that is one of the main reasons that Scherkoske’s conception of integrity requires that epistemic agents engage in public deliberation to test the strength of the reasons for their convictions. He claims that we are “epistemic peers” that must bear epistemic responsibility for our convictions and stand for them in public deliberation. Integrity, according to this view, is fundamentally a matter of “leading a convincing life.” This metaphor is unpacked in two chapters. Leading a convincing life is a matter of possessing “well-placed self-trust” and “epistemic trustworthiness.” Integrity, in this sense, is a rare virtue: “Achieving integrity over a life-sized set of convictions, and over life-sized stretches of time, is a considerable achievement. If the arguments here have been convincing, exhibiting integrity is a fundamentally epistemic achievement” (146). Scherkoske develops his conception of the well-placed self-trust that this epistemic virtue requires by drawing from recent work on the pragmatics of assertion and acts of giving assurance to others. This foray into the philosophy of language is one of the most exploratory sections of the book. He develops a view of “discursive responsibilities” that aims to show that by the mere act of asserting, one is “on the hook” for the convictions that one asserts (174). The discussion of “the performative aspects” of the epistemic virtue aims to show its broad scope and role in everyday life.

The ambition that motivates Scherkoske’s account of integrity as an epistemic virtue is admirable, but the arguments are not convincing. The assumption that all persons have the same “epistemic status” is empirically false. Many people have cognitive impairments and mental disorders that render them incapable of taking care of themselves. Frankly, it is surprising that an educator would assert that all persons have the same epistemic status. Scherkoske’s conception of integrity describes a virtue that is in the business of telling other people how they ought to live—that’s an important dimension of leading a convin-

cing life. This disposition may be common among philosophers, but it is not a trait that would be good for everyone to possess. The life of philosopher-kings and philosopher-queens is not suited for everyone. Scherkoske's arguments would have benefited from examining more examples of persons of integrity. Without clear cases in view, the discussion remains at a level of abstraction and generality that seems irrelevant to practical, first-order normative questions about integrity, temptation, and conflicting commitments. He says that his theory has practical relevance, but without clear cases of persons of integrity in view, I remain unconvinced. He says in passing that Abraham Lincoln, Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King Jr., and Hans Blix are "canonical images" of persons of integrity. However, he does not explain how they exemplify his platitudes, and the list of examples is narrowly focused on admirable activists and politicians. It's unclear to me who put together this canon. Would Oscar Wilde be a contender? Also, Scherkoske's disparaging perspective on insincerity and bullshitting (177–81) suggests that comedians (e.g., Margaret Cho, Woody Allen, or Groucho Marx) could not have integrity (unless their professions are somehow convincing people to act for good reasons!). The emphasis on "epistemic responsibilities" and "discursive responsibilities" trivializes the personal integrity of individuals whose lives are rich with metaphor and who pursue projects that are outside the domains of the intellectual and assertoric. Scherkoske would deny that personal integrity is anything other than integrity being expressed in the context of one's personal life—at bottom, he claims, there are not different forms of integrity. He claims that what are commonly regarded to be different forms of integrity are actually different heads of the same beast: "there is considerable pressure to look for some common set of capacities and traits that account for what is common to the different respects or ways of manifesting the virtue, rather than to posit different types of integrity" (100). The "pressure" is supported by similar assertions put forth by Cox, Levine, and LaCaze in their *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on the topic (99). Scherkoske's arguments and the literature on integrity would benefit from avoiding this pernicious falsehood. Rather than look for a general theory of integrity, it is advisable for inquiries into the nature of integrity to clearly distinguish *honesty*, *personal integrity*, and *moral integrity*. Integrity and truthfulness require being guided by standards. Moral integrity is a matter of being guided by objective moral standards, and personal integrity involves being guided by personal standards. There are also philosophically interesting forms of psychological integrity that do not involve being guided by standards but may involve various forms of psychological integration.

SCHERKOSKE ON WILLIAMS'S CONCEPTION OF INTEGRITY

Four chapters of the book examine Williams's conception of integrity. One useful contribution to the literature is that Scherkoske observes that Williams's conception of integrity can place persons of integrity in "moral danger." For Williams, having integrity is a matter of being true to one's deep commitments. Scherkoske observes that Williams-style integrity places one in three kinds of moral danger: (1) it may be an expression of self-indulgence or egoism, (2) it may involve "blind allegiance" to one's convictions, and (3) it may lead to undue "self-protection" when one's commitments are immoral or otherwise in need of change. He describes Williams's conception of integrity as being "loyalty-exhibiting" (it requires loyalty

to one's deep commitments) and "morally dangerous." Scherkoske contends that these moral dangers render Williams's conception of integrity descriptively and normatively inadequate, and integrity is best understood with the conception of integrity that he endorses. I have argued elsewhere that Williams's conception of integrity is best read as a conception of personal integrity. Following the dictates of personal integrity does place one in a certain kind of moral danger: it does not shield one from violating objective moral standards. That is a salient difference between personal and moral integrity. The demands of personal integrity may be at odds with the demands of moral integrity. However, the fact that personal integrity can place one in moral danger does not establish that personal integrity is not a virtue. Personal integrity is a virtue, but it does place one at risk of being committed to evil projects. (Here I assume that the unity of the virtues is not true: i.e., it is not the case that if you have any of the virtues, then you have all of the virtues.) Scherkoske would undoubtedly point out that, for Williams, integrity is not a virtue (73). Scherkoske briefly discusses Williams's argument for this striking claim. Williams's argument is that integrity is not a virtue because it is neither an "executive virtue" nor a virtue that has a distinctive thought or motive associated with it. Scherkoske agrees with Williams on both of these points. It is unclear why we should follow them in assuming that the two kinds of virtue on offer exhaust the set of virtues. It was a misstep for Williams to suggest that integrity is not a virtue. Indeed, in a quote from Williams that Scherkoske discusses, Williams makes the characteristically guarded remark that "one should perhaps say that integrity is not a virtue at all," which is not an unqualified assertion that integrity is not a virtue (73). Also, both Williams and Scherkoske assert that integrity is not an executive virtue, but no argument is given for this obscure claim. This is another area where more discussion of the nature of the virtues would have been helpful.

No discussion of Williams's conception of integrity would be complete without examining his critique of utilitarianism: "In barest outline, the integrity objection is a complaint, at once both general and deep, that impartial moral theories are systematically incapable of finding room for integrity in human life and character" (186). Scherkoske raises the important question of whether consequentialists have laid this worry to rest, and his answer to the question, which he develops in two chapters, is yes. Contrary to Scherkoske and to claims that are persistently made in the literature, Williams's integrity objection is not a general critique of impartial moral theories, and it is not a critique of consequentialism. Williams's integrity objection is a criticism of *act utilitarianism*! He does not provide an integrity-based critique of consequentialism in general or to Kantianism. Williams's objection to Kantianism is that it has an impoverished conception of character. He never claims that Kantianism, rule utilitarianism, or perfectionist consequentialism undermine integrity. This error is widespread in the literature on integrity.

There do seem to be compelling examples of individuals who have personal integrity but who are unreflective (e.g., Forrest Gump) or immoral (e.g., Walter White, Bonnie and Clyde) or struggle with mental illness (e.g., Romulus Gaita). Scherkoske's theory suggests that they lack integrity. Some readers may be attracted to the intellectual and epistemic approach to integrity that is defended in the book. I prefer an approach that attends more carefully to the particulars.

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This volume, like the others in the series, contains fertile discussion of key battlegrounds in contemporary metaethics. Space is short so I give brief, unequal, paper summaries, and some critical observations. Brevity maximizes apparent disagreement, so let me add at the outset that all the papers are cutting-edge work and testament to the high standards employed by the editor.

First up is Christine Korsgaard's "The Relational Nature of the Good." Korsgaard starts by pointing out the tangles that G. E. Moore got himself into discussing 'my own good' in *Principia Ethica*. Her view is presented thus: "It is not true that we need to know what is good before we know what is good-for someone, since despite its surface grammar, the notion of *good-for someone* is in fact the prior and more fundamental notion" (7). How should we interpret this (what kind of priority and fundamentality are in play? Is it an epistemic claim, a semantic claim, or something else?)? Korsgaard's discussion is sometimes about "notions" (4), sometimes concepts (13), and sometimes "the good" (5). Korsgaard mostly uses concept talk and explicitly discusses concepts, so ascribing a conceptual thesis to her seems fair. This also makes sense of her describing an opposing view—that something can be good without being good for someone—as "unintelligible" (4). But this seems overambitious. Suppose one held that it would be better (in at least one respect) for well-being to be distributed equally, even if by leveling down (so no individual is made better off). Such a view is controversial, but can we not even make sense of it? Is it unintelligible? I think not. Indeed its making sense seems to explain the ease with which I am able to judge that it is false.

Another example Korsgaard mentions is the view that it is better that sentient life exists than that it not have existed. Given plausible assumptions, this is not true in virtue of existence rather than nonexistence being good for the existent (or the universe). But it is clearly intelligible that it is better that the universe contains sentient life than not.

Jonathan Way's "Value and Reasons for Favour" provides support for the *fitting attitude* (FA) analysis of value, the view that for something to be valuable is for it to be a fitting object of a proattitude. Rather than performing defensive maneuvers, Way assesses the credentials of alternate views that analyze reasons in terms of value. The key issue is whether such alternatives to FA analyses are (equally) capable of explaining this linking principle: if R is a consideration in which an outcome is good, then R is a reason to favor that outcome.